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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1339 
___________ 
 
FENG LIN, 
  Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
       Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A072-371-482) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 2, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 5, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner, Feng Lin, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA or 
Board) order denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we will deny the petition for review.  
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I. 
 Lin, a native of China, entered the United States illegally in 1993.  He 
subsequently applied for asylum and related relief based on his opposition to China’s 
birth control policies, but the Immigration Judge denied his applications.   
More than eight years later, in May 2012, Lin filed a motion to reopen the 
proceedings.  Recognizing that his motion was untimely, Lin sought to meet the 
exception for motions that rely on material evidence of changed country conditions.  See 
INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)]; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Lin 
explained that, in January 2010, while living in the United States, he joined the Party for 
Freedom and Democracy in China (PFDC).
1
  According to Lin, the Chinese government 
had discovered his affiliation with this group, and, in March 2010, arrested his father and 
interrogated him about Lin’s political activities.  Lin claimed that he would be persecuted 
if forced to return to China, and sought reopening so that he could apply for asylum on 
these grounds.  In support of his motion, Lin submitted, inter alia, a copy of his PFDC 
membership card, photographs of him participating in PFDC activities, letters from his 
father and sister in China, an affidavit from a leader of the PFDC, and background 
country conditions material.         
                                              
1
 The documents that Lin submitted in support of his motion refer to the political party 
with which he is affiliated as both the “Party for Freedom and Democracy in China” and 
the “Chinese Democratic Party.” 
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The BIA found that the evidence Lin submitted did not establish that country 
conditions had changed since his hearing in 2002.  The Board noted that Lin’s 
submissions “largely concern his U.S. activities, rather than country conditions in China.”  
(AR00003) (citing Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 2006), for the proposition 
that a “self-induced change in personal circumstances cannot suffice”).  The Board 
further noted that the unsworn statements of Lin’s family members were not 
authenticated, were created for the purpose of litigation, and were from interested parties 
not subject to cross-examination.  According to the Board, absent corroborating evidence 
demonstrating that the Chinese government was aware of Lin’s political activities in the 
United States, these statements did not provide a basis for reopening.  Because Lin had 
not presented sufficient evidence to meet the changed country conditions exception, the 
Board denied the motion as untimely.  This petition for review followed.      
II. 
   We have jurisdiction over this petition for review pursuant to INA § 242(a) [8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)].  Because “[m]otions to reopen immigration proceedings are viewed 
with strong disfavor, . . . we review the BIA’s decision to deny reopening for abuse of 
discretion, mindful of the broad deference that the Supreme Court would have us afford.”  
Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 106 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  Under this standard, we may reverse the agency’s decision only if it is 
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“arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  
An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file it with the 
BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was 
rendered.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  The time and number requirements do not apply to 
motions that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions arising in the country of 
nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have 
been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”  INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 
also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).   
 We agree with the BIA that Lin failed to establish changed country conditions 
material to his asylum claim.  The Board correctly noted that Lin’s participation in the 
PFDC since January 2010 constitutes a change in personal circumstances rather than a 
change in conditions in China.  See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 497 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(explaining that the petitioner’s choice to engage in political activities in the United 
States after being deported does not support application of the changed country 
conditions exception).  Furthermore, Lin’s changed country conditions evidence does not 
indicate that the Chinese government’s treatment of political dissidents has significantly 
worsened since 2002.  Finally, the Board reasonably declined to give substantial weight 
to the letters from Lin’s sister and father stating that the Chinese government was looking 
 5 
 
for Lin.  Cf. In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010), overruled on 
other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012).   
 We have reviewed Lin’s objections to the BIA’s decision, and conclude that they 
are unpersuasive.  Accordingly, we see no basis for concluding that the Board abused its 
discretion in denying reopening on the grounds that Lin’s motion was untimely and he 
did not qualify for the changed country conditions exception under INA § 
240(c)(7)(C)(ii). 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review will be denied.   
